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I. INTRODUCTION: NATIONS WITHIN A NATION
At one end of the hall, in a constitutional law course on the struc-
ture of American government, we analyze federalism, the give and
take of state and national sovereignty. At the other end of the hall, in
another course on federal Indian law, we analyze the history and real-
ity of the inherent sovereignty of tribal nations. In this academic
sense, a traditional study of federalism occurs in a course on constitu-
tional law, but a student interested in learning more about tribal sov-
ereignty, and the give and take of state/tribal/national interaction,
must be sent "down the hall" to a course on federal Indian law. This
artificial dichotomy, separating tribes and their governments from
the constitutional architecture of the United States, diminishes the
history, reality, and importance of tribes as domestic sovereign na-
tions.
For more than two hundred years, the term "federalism" has been
used to contemplate the dynamic, flexible, ever-changing, and diffi-
cult-to-define relationship between two constitutionally recognized
divisions of American government,' a relationship defined through
an ongoing evolutionary process of Supreme Court opinions, consti-
tutional language, and actual practice. The longstanding legal de-
bate within federalism has been primarily over the appropriate distri-
bution of sovereign authority to wield decision-making power
between the national government and the States, rather than the
identities of the players in the dynamics of federalism. The central
argument of this Comment is that governmental decision-making
authority in the United States involves not only the national and state
governments, but also the tribal nations. An important player has
been effectively neglected, if not completely omitted, in traditional
constitutional federalism debate. Therefore, the most appropriate
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designation for the constitutional division of sovereign authority in
American government is not "federalism" but "trifederalism," based
upon constitutional language, treaties, Supreme Court precedent,
and actual practice.2  Although basic constitutional law textbooks do
not (yet) acknowledge trifederalism, it does exist, both in principle
and in practice.
There is great divergence of opinion, particularly among scholars
who defend the sovereign authority of tribal nations, about the legal
relationship of these nations to the United States government and to
the States. In much of the literature, emphasis is placed upon the
conceptualization of tribes as independent international sovereigns
outside the structure of American government, with some scholars
callin for a renewal of treaty making between tribes and the United
States. Historically, tribes stood as totally independent international
sovereigns, each equal in status to the United States government, and
the structural relationship of tribal nations to the United States has
been based largely upon treaties. These facts have served as premises
for the conclusion by many that tribal nations must lack constitu-
tional status as sovereigns within the governmental structure of the
United States.
The term "trifederalism," referring to the interaction of the national, state, and tribal gov-
ernments as three types of constitutionally recognized limited sovereigns, was defined by this
author. See Carol Tebben, Trifederalism: The Constitutional Recognition of National, State,
and Tribal Sovereignty, Address Before the Wisconsin Political Science Association Conference
(Nov. 6,1998).
See, e.g., VINE DELORIA, JR., BEHIND THE TRAIL OF BROKEN TREATIES 254 (1974) ("With the
tribes having international status, the [SItates would have no more power to interfere with
tribal governments or reservation affairs than they would have to interfere with the operations
of the Canadian or Mexican government."); JOHN WUNDER, "RETAINED BY THE PEOPLE": A
HISTORY OF AMERICAN INDIANS AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS 8 (1994) (quoting John Clinebell & Jim
Thomson, Sovereignty and Self-Determination: The Rights of Native Americans Under International Law,
27 BUFF. L. REV. 669 (1978) ("Native Americans have been sovereign nations for centuries and
continue to be under international law.")); Kirke Kickingbird et al., Indian Sovereignty, in NATIVE
AMERICAN SOVEREIGNTY 13 (John Wunder ed., 1999) ("It is possible that a return to the treaty
relationship or at least some variation of it, along with an accompanying recognition of sover-
eignty, is the only way to prevent non-Indian governments from interfering in the affairs of In-
dian nations."); Anne McCulloch, The Politics of Indian Gaming: Tribe/State Relations and American
Federalism, 24 PUBLIUS 99, 102-03 (1994) (identifying three positions on tribal sovereignty: tribes
as international sovereigns, tribes with no sovereignty, and a middle position with tribes as sov-
ereign but domestic nations under federal protection); Glen T. Morris, International Law and
Politics: Toward a Right to Self-Determination for Indigenous Peoples, in NATIVE AMERICAN
SOVEREIGNTY 323 (John Wunder ed., 1999):
[With respect to tribes as international sovereigns,]not only would the extension of the
right to self-determination to indigenous nations, even if it meant secession, promote the
expansion of rights in the world, it would also promote predictable international
mechanisms of resolving disputes between indigenous nations and the [S]tates around
them, leading to an overall expansion of global freedom, peace, and stability.
See also S. James Anaya, The Rights of Indigenous Peoples and International Law in Historical and Con-
temporary Perspective, 1989 HARV. INDIAN L. SYMP. 191 (1990).
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The conceptual framework suggested in this Comment is not in-
tended necessarily as a direct confrontation with the conceptualiza-
tion of tribes as independent international sovereigns. Gerald Alfred,
in the context of the Kahnawake Mohawk, has explained:
But while the majority of Canadians wish to see native societies integrated
within the social and political framework they have created, Mohawks re-
ject the idea of buying into what are essentially foreign institutions. They
have recognized the political realities and the necessities of cooperating
with Canadian authorities to create institutions and arrangements which
will afford the community control over its internal organization, ex-
panded jurisdictional powers, and more flexible external relationships.
Canadians perceive these as ultimate objectives; Mohawks assuredly do
not.
Having a clear sense of their goals does not cause the Mohawks of
Kahnawake to develop tunnel vision with respect to interim measures.
Without prejudice to the nationalistic goals, Kahnawake is aggressive in
pursuing pragmatic arrangements to ensure that in the meantime the
community achieves a level of security and prosperity.4
The conceptualization of a constitutionally sanctioned, three-
sovereign government that includes tribes within the structure of
American government may represent a stepping stone to a higher
and independent tribal nation status. A pragmatic arrangement in
the meantime may be a constitutional trifederalism. Ongoing inter-
action occurs among the three sovereigns as though tribes are in-
cluded within the structure of American government, yet without the
benefit of an unambiguous judicial reference to the structure (or
make-up, or constitution) of American government itself. As a result
of this interaction, which lacks clarity about the constitutional sover-
eignty of tribes, sovereign tribal rights are given extreme marginaliza-
tion and often are ignored.' Without abandoning the defense of the
sovereign status of tribes as nations, this comment comprehends the
larger reality that tribes, with their inherent sovereignty, have become
incorporated into the overall structure of government within the
United States as domestic rather than "independent international"
sovereigns. 6 Since tribes are treated matter-of-factly by the States and
4 GERALD ALFRED, HEEDING THE VOICES OF OUR ANCESTORS 103 (1995).
5 This is not to imply that the lack of judicial acknowledgment of the constitutional status of
tribal nations is the major force in the marginalization of tribal self-government, but rather that
it is a contributing factor to the marginalization that has been spawned by ethnocentrism, ra-
cism, and abandonment of democratic principles.
6 As Richard Monette states, "[w] hat we must conclude is that, while tribes were once inter-
national sovereigns, today their spheres of sovereignty overlap with the United States of Amer-
ica." Richard Monette, Sovereignty and Survival, 86 A.B.A.J. 64, 65 (2000). Robert Clinton also
emphasizes that, "[hiowever nonconsensual inclusion of Indian tribes within the union origi-
nally was, that process constitutes an accomplished historical and political fact." Robert
Clinton, Tribal Courts and the Federal Union, 26 WIL[AMETrE L. REV. 841, 889 (1990). See also
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national government as sovereigns within American government, it is
imperative to strengthen that sovereignty by clarifying the constitu-
tional status of tribes as nations within a nation.
Is the inclusion of tribal nations, particularly constitutional inclu-
sion within the structure of American government, merely an assimi-
lation threatening the sustained strength of sovereign tribal author-
ity? One perspective would be to view inclusion as "a wholly new
direction for federal Indian law.",8 The most effective protection of
tribal separateness and empowerment may be found in the acknowl-
edgment, particularly the unclouded judicial acknowledgment, of
tribal nations as constitutionally recognized sovereigns. A core un-
derlying assumption of the three-sovereign framework is that consti-
tutional inclusion, and a renewed judicial recognition of the constitu-
tional status of tribal governments, have the potential to give greater
protection to unique tribal cultures from continued dominance and
interference. This discussion offers the counterintuitive proposition
that constitutional inclusion may promote a more meaningful sepa-
rateness.
II. OBSCURE BEGINNINGS
Since its inception, the Constitution of the United States has rec-
ognized three sovereigns within the structure of American govern-
ment. The Constitution contemplates a sovereign national govern-
ment which the document was written to create, at a time when it was
crucial to the people that the reserved sovereign powers of the preex-
istent state governments be protected. Tribal nations represent the
third type of government recognized in the Constitution, although
practical inclusion of these constitutionally recognized sovereigns
within the structure of American government has come gradually
Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990) (rejecting the argument that tribes are international sover-
eigns).
7 The concept of tribes as nations within the United States was addressed, for example, in
VINE DELORIA, JR. & CUFFORD LYrE, THE NATIONS WITHIN: THE PAST AND FLTrURE OF
AMERICAN INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY (1984).
As Monette states, "[vlery few scholars unabashedly argue that tribes should strive for a
structured relationship on our domestic plane," and "[w]ith tribes no longer on the interna-
tional plane, treating tribes as states for purposes of applying the logic of our federalism pro-
vides a wholly new direction for federal Indian law." Richard Monette, A New Federalism for In-
dian Tribes: The Relationship Between the United States and Tribes in Light of Our Federalism and
Republican Democracy, 25 U. TOL. L. REV. 617, 631 nn.8-9, 633 (1994); see also W. Dale Mason,
Tribes and States: A New Era in Intergovernmental Affairs, 28 PUBLIUS 111, 130 (1998) ("In the cur-
rent era of self-determination, tribal governments have begun to take their place in the system
of American federalism. The basis for this is the U.S. Constitution and the political determina-
tion by the federal government that tribes do have a place in that system.").
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over time. Together, these three limited sovereigns participate in a
tripartite system of government known as trifederalism.
Largely out of concern that the central government created by the
Articles of Confederation would not survive, the Constitution was
written to establish a more powerful, albeit limited, national govern-
ment. This government was to possess extensive powers, including
both explicitly delegated powers enumerated in the document and
implicitly delegated powers later defined by the Supreme Court as
implied powers. The people were unwilling to yield the total power
of the preexistent state governments to the newly-created national
government, so any power not delegated to the federal government
was reserved to the States. The States retain some decision-making
authority as limited sovereigns, while at the same time they are often
heavily regulated by the federal government. During the formative
years of the United States, the Supreme Court expended much time
and effort in defining the limits of state sovereignty especially as it re-
lated to national governmental power.
Tribal nations, which predate both the national and state gov-
ernments, were given constitutional recognition ab initio in the
Commerce Clause, which states that Congress has the power to "regu-
late Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States,
and with the Indian Tribes."9 The Constitution made no attempt to
extinguish the sovereignty of tribal nations, but instead recognized
that Congress was to deal with the tribes on issues of commerce. Na-
tive tribes were recognized as governmental bodies in the Commerce
Clause. Even the exclusion of "Indians not taxed" from state popula-
tion rolls for purposes of representation in the House of Representa-
tives impliedly recognized tribal nations as independent of the States
and the Union, although this recognition was less direct than that
contained in the Commerce Clause. 0 In this sense, exclusion from
population count and citizenship was an indication of the recogni-
tion of the separate and sovereign status of tribal nations. Although
the coaptation of the tribal governments, the States, and the national
government was not apparent or understood at the Founding, the
governmental relationship that was established has evolved over time.
Currently, each of the three divisions of American government-na-
tional, state, and tribal-possesses limited sovereign authority.
Our Constitution was established solidly upon the foundation of
self-government, a principle that has application at the national,
state, and tribal levels. One critical example of this principle is found
in the Tenth Amendment, which states: "The powers not delegated to
the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the
9 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
10 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2.
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States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.""
These words giving recognition to the reserved power of the States
also provide explicit support for the reserved power of Native gov-
ernments. The amendment goes deeper than stating that the power
which is not delegated to the United States government is reserved to
the States by including the phrase "or to the people." The command-
ing words "to the people," inclusive of the Native peoples of tribal
America as United States citizens, give constitutional cover to self-
government in Indian country and to the sovereignty placed in these
governments by the people. The Tenth Amendment augments other
constitutional language by providing an explicit basis for the constitu-
tional recognition of the sovereign tribal right of self-government.
All decision-making power has not been concentrated in the national
government of the United States. The plain language of this
amendment protects those Americans who have chosen extra-
constitutionally to vest some sovereign power in the States and, in
addition, protects those Americans who have extra-constitutionally
chosen to vest some sovereign power in the tribal governments.
There exists a reservation of power not delegated to the government
of the United States that the people of Native America have bestowed
upon tribal governments, just as there exists a reservation of power
not delegated to the government of the United States that the people
of the States have bestowed upon state governments.
Tribes are often described in Indian law scholarship as 'pre-
constitutional' and 'extra-constitutional,"' designations that can give
rise to the implication that tribal sovereign authority must lack consti-
tutional status. Under a framework of trifederalism, the characteriza-
tion of tribes as pre-constitutional is considered to be an accurate
one. The designation of tribes as extra-constitutional is accurate only
to some extent, however, because tribes do possess constitutional
status as sovereign domestic nations within the government of the
United States. The right of popular sovereignty itself is recognized in
the structure of American government as pre-constitutional and ex-
tra-constitutional. Under this principle, the people placed some
power in the States through state constitutions, and to their loosely
organized federation under the Articles of Confederation. The peo-
ple then conferred some governing authority upon the newly created
national government under the Constitution, reserving some power
11 U.S. CONST. amend. X.
12 See, e.g., McCulloch, supra note 3, at 111 ("Unlike [S]tates, Indian tribes are not part of
the constitutional construction of the United States."); see also DAVID WILKINS, AMERICAN INDIAN
SOVEREIGNTY AND THE U.S. SUPREME COURT 320 n.10 (1997) ("Tribes, I argue, have an extra-
constitutional status because of their preexisting, original sovereignty; because they were exist-
ing sovereigns, they were not parties to the U.S. Constitution or state constitutions.").
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to the States and to the people themselves. Both the tribes and the
States are pre-constitutional in the sense that both kinds of govern-
ments existed as sovereigns before the creation of the United States
Constitution." Moreover, both the tribes and the States have some
reserved extra-constitutional sovereign authority that has not been
delegated to the national government, even though the delegation
process itself was not the same for each kind of government. Both
States and tribes are recognized as sovereign governments in the
document; both have constitutional status.
In addition to possessing reserved sovereign authority, there is a
critical sense in which the tribes are extra-constitutional, or more
specifically, extra-Bill of Rights. The protections in the Bill of Rights
apply directly only against the national government, 14 and most of
these protections apply indirectly to the States through the Due Pro-
cess Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by the process of selective
incorporation. Neither the Bill of Rights nor the Fourteenth
Amendment' limits the sovereignty of domestic tribal nations.' 7 In
addition to the contexts in which tribal nations may be accurately de-
scribed as extra-constitutional, there are other contexts in which
tribal nations and their people do have constitutional status. The
Commerce Clause and the Tenth Amendment represent two exam-
ples, and there are more.
The national government has a long history of honoring or rec-
ognizing tribal sovereign authority with the creation of treaties, which
are by definition and common understanding, agreements between
two sovereigns. 18 These agreements made between the national gov-
ernment and tribal governments bolster the constitutional status of
the tribes because, along with laws of Congress and the Constitution
itself, they are the supreme law of the land. 9 The Department of Jus-
tice has observed the link between treaties and the constitutional
status of tribal sovereignty with its declaration that "[o]ur Constitu-
tion recognizes Indian sovereignty by classing Indian treaties among
13 The States that joined the Union after ratification of the Constitution are considered con-
structively pre-constitutional under the equal footing doctrine. See Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1
(1894).
14 See Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 242 (1833).
15 See Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376 (1896) (declaring that tribes are not a unit of the federal
government).
'6 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
17 As a reaction to this fact, Congress imposed the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, applying
constitution-like limitations against tribal governments, and claiming the source of legitimacy
for this legislation to be the Constitution. 25 U.S.C. § 1301 (1990).
18 With the ratification of the Constitution in 1788, our new national government was bound
to honor existing obligations entered into by the government under the Articles of Confedera-
tion. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 1.
19 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
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the 'supreme law of the land."'2 ° In some cases the promises made in
21prior treaties were superseded by federal law or ignored com-
pletely," yet a number of treaties with tribes are still in effect today.
The United States government continues to recognize the validity of
past sovereign-to-sovereign treaties. The relationship of the United
States government to the sovereign tribes has changed over time, and
"the measure of sovereignty upon entering treaty negotiations may be
vastly different than that which emerges, especially if a federal type of
relationship is contemplated and intended by both parties. 2 3 The
treaty process itself has played a vital role in defining tribes as an in-
tegral and sovereign element within the overall structure of American
government, and in defining the state/national/tribal constitutional
relationship.
It is no coincidence that the term "reservation" referring to the
power reserved in the Tenth Amendment 24 and the term "reserva-
tion" used to denote tribal lands are identical. Both symbolize a con-
cept of rights predating the Constitution. The Supreme Court has
over the years identified many rights in addition to land occupancy,
which were "reserved" to tribal nations. 25  The Court affirmed that
many rights, in addition to the occupancy of land, were reserved to
tribes after treaties with the United States government, when it de-
clared:
In other words the treaty was not a grant of rights to the Indians, but a
grant of rights from them-a reservation of those not granted .... And
the right[s were] intended to be continuing against the United States
and its grantees as well as against the States and its grantees.
26
In their innovative analysis of the treaty-making process between the
United States and tribal nations, an analysis that has significance for
the theory of a constitutional trifederal structure, Barsh and
Henderson have proposed that the doctrine of "treaty federalism"
20 U.S. Dep't of Justice, Policy on Indian Sovereignty and Government-to-Government Relations with
Indian Tribes (1999), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/otj/sovtrb.htm (last visitedJan. 9, 2003).
The policy statement also declares that the trust responsibility "includes the protection of the
sovereignty of each tribal government." Id.
21 See United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734 (1986) (holding that the Endangered Species Act
and the Eagle Protection Act overrode treaty rights).
See ANGIE DEBO, AND STILL THE WATERS RUN (1940) (exposing blatant corruption in the
denial of treaty rights in Oklahoma).
Monette, supra note 8, at 631.
24 U.S. CONST. amend. X.
25 See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978). See also Winters v. United States,
207 U.S. 564 (1908) (discussing reserved tribal right to water).
United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 381-82 (1905).
Jan. 2003]
JOURNAL OF CONSMT7TI'UlONAL LA W
explains the "consensual distribution of powers between the tribes
and the United States., 27 According to this doctrine, they argue that:
Even if the Constitution itself did not guarantee certain inalienable po-
litical rights to all citizens, tribes would be entitled to political self-
determination by virtue of their agreements with the United States ....
They are political compacts irrevocably annexing tribes to the federal sys-
tem in a status parallel to, but not identical with, that of the [S] tates.
"Treaty federalism" asserts that the connection between the govern-
ment of the United States and the tribes "is discernible only in the
hundreds of treaties which link them and give authority to federal
supremacy."2 It is not argued here that treaties should be regarded
as the only component, because many tribes have no treaties with the
United States, and treaties are supported by explicit constitutional
language in creating a state/national/tribal constitutional relation-
ship. Rather, treaties are one critical component in the recognition
that tribal nations have been brought within the constitutional struc-
ture of American government, and as one critical component in the
recognition of tripartite federalism. Barsh and Henderson add cre-
dence to the proposition that tribes were indeed annexed to our fed-
eral system of government.
Legal scholar Richard Monette, in a perceptive contribution to
our understanding of the state/national/tribal relationship under
the Constitution,'o asserts that tribes have a federal relationship with
the national government, based upon treaties, constitutional provi-
sions, and Supreme Court precedent. Monette builds upon the
treaty federalism perspective of Barsh and Henderson by stating:
To reiterate, the [S] tates granted to the Union through the Commerce
Clause their inherent power to deal with tribes on the international
plane. The treaty process provided the mechanism for effectuating such
commercial dealings. In Worcester, the resulting treaty served to bring the
tribe within the sovereign sphere of the federal Union. Therefore, al-
though the Commerce Clause is a critical link in establishing the Un-
ion/state/tribe relationship, it is but one link. The other equally neces-
sary link is the Treaty Clause. Although the interstate Commerce Clause
is a source of Union power over the [S]tates by express delegation, the
"Indian Commerce Clause" alone is not a source of Union power over
27 RUSSELL BARSH & JAMES HENDERSON, THE ROAD: INDIAN TRIBES AND POLrITCAL LIBERY
270 (1980).
8 Id.
2 Id. at 279-280.
30 See Monette, supra note 8.
31 Monette calls the relationship between the tribes and the national government "our other
federalism," and points out that the word federal comes from the Latin word foedus, which means
"treaty" and is a cognate of the word fides, meaning "faith." Monette, supra note 8, at 627, 631.
David Walker, in his book on state and national federalism, defines the word foedus as "'cove-
nant' not 'treaty.'" WALKER, supra note 1, at 60.
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tribes. Such Union power requires the Treaty Clause and a treaty upon
which to hang an inter-sovereign relationship. Such treaties will then be
construed as the Constitution itself-as a grant of rights from the local
source of sovereignty to the Union with a reservation of those rights not
granted, guided by principles of republican democracy and in the spirit
of Our Federalism.
3
For Monette, this constitutionally sanctioned treaty process creates a
state/national/tribal relationship, because the States, or the people
of the States, granted power in the Constitution to the national gov-
ernment to regulate commerce with the tribes and the power to ef-
fect treaties. In addition, Monette points out that through the Su-
premacy Clause, which declares treaties to be the supreme law of the
land, treaties have become incorporated into state law and policy,
and have cemented the state/national/tribal relationship.3
In forming treaties with the national government, the people of
tribal nations became participants in a sovereign-to-sovereign federal,
or federated, or federative, relationship with the national govern-
ment as a "protector." This kind of analysis whitewashes history, es-
pecially the reality of armed cavalry, exploitation, and broken prom-
ises that has belied a protecting role. Yet the tribal/state/federal
relationship does exist, and buried in the confusion of the relation-
ship are sound and enduring principles of agreement. Anticipating
that this conceptualization does not work well for tribes without trea-
ties, Monette endorses the idea of an equal footing doctrine for
tribes, which would construct a legal equality of treaty situation where
one does not technically exist.' This principle would mirror the
equal footing doctrine as applied to the States, which has created a
state legal equality, not accurate in a technical sense, that all States
created the national government. 5
Frank Pommersheim lends support to the constitutional inclusion
perspective with an articulate call for a national/tribal relationship of
"constitutional 'faith,'" based upon "important foundational under-
standings relative to the constitutional status of tribal sovereignty and
principles of treaty federalism." 36 He advocates the continued and
expanded vibrancy of tribal courts not only to counterbalance con-
gressional intrusion into matters tribal, but also to counterbalance a
32 Monette, supra note 8, at 640. Also, the Treaty Clause states, "The President shall have
Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make treaties, provided two-thirds
of those present concur." U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
33 Monette, supra, note 8, at 647; see also U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
34 Monette, supra note 8, at 661.
35 See Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1 (1894), discussed in Monette, supra note 8, at 659.
36 Frank Pommersheim, Tribal Courts and the FederalJudiciary: Opportunities and Challenges for a
Constitutional Democracy, 58 MONT. L. REV. 313, 329 n.73 (1997).
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defacto 'judicial plenary power" created by the Supreme Court. 7 In
summary, he observes that
[a] 11 of this needs to be pursued and explored within a yet to be ade-
quately identified constitutional framework-a constitutional framework
that nevertheless can be discerned within principles of treaty federal-
ism .... All of these concerns are currently unhinged from any mean-
ingful constitutional idiom or discourse and threaten to permanently ex-
tend the plenary power doctrine into the judicial realm. The sum of
these developments reveals a journey--though seldom recognized-of
great constitutional and historical import that needs the increased un-
derstanding and engagement of all of us within the legal community.
Without this consciousness and commitment, there is only likely to be
more aimless wandering in an (extra) constitutional wilderness.
Pommersheim's concept of "constitutional faith" blends well with the
Barsh, Henderson, and Monette efforts to analyze the tribal/sta-
te/national relationship, a relationship whose paradigm shift has
been a continual one. The trifederalism perspective presented in this
comment may assist in adequately identifying the constitutional
framework of American government.
A crucial constitutional principle underlying both reserved state
and reserved tribal sovereignty is the concept of multiple sovereigns
in American government. The liberty of Americans was purposely
protected in the Constitution by preventing the concentration of
power. In The Federalist No. 51, Madison explicitly recognized the di-
vision of power among multiple sovereigns (along with separation of
powers into three branches) as an example of such protection when
he stated:
In the compound republic of America, the power surrendered by the
people is first divided between two distinct governments, and then the
portion allotted to each subdivided among distinct and separate depart-
ments. Hence a double security arises to the rights of the people. The
different governments will control each other, at the same time that each
will be controlled by itself:'1
Madison felt so strongly that individual liberty would be protected by
maintaining power in the States as a counterbalance to national
power, that he was willing to support a constitution without a national
bill of rights. Having participated in state politics, and in the creation
of the Virginia Statute for Religious Liberty, Madison strongly sup-
ported the idea of protecting liberties at the state level, while at the
same time defending a meaningful national power. 4° The principle
37 Id. at 328.
38 Id. at 331-32 (internal citations omitted).
39 THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison) (Roy P. Fairfield ed., 1966).
40 The Virginia statute was authored by Thomas Jefferson, with input and support from
Madison. Even John Marshall, though a staunch member of the Federalist political party which
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of multiple sovereigns as a benefit to liberty runs deep in American
constitutional jurisprudence.
The Tenth Amendment reflects the concept of protecting liberty
by the division of power among multiple sovereigns. 4' This amend-
ment was written at a time when Native peoples were not recognized
as United States citizens and Native cultures were given little respect,
yet these words were also written at a time when sovereign tribes were
gradually being enveloped within the United States. A theory of con-
stitutional trifederalism acknowledges that the same critical protec-
tion of liberty through the principle of multiple sovereigns, which is
so important to retaining state power, extends to the Americans who
are tribal citizens. 42 The concentration of power in the government
of the United States is no less a threat to the liberty of people today
than it was in James Madison's day, and tribal citizens are United
States citizens. Conceptions of the structure of American govern-
ment that exclude the reserved sovereign authority of domestic tribal
nations in effect dismiss the inalienable rights of tribal Americans,
characterizing these rights as a tangent to liberty.
It may be argued that the Framers intended only to create a two-
part federalism when creating the Constitution. Yet, even if they were
not fully aware of all the implications of the language used, in reality
the seeds of a tripartite system were sown from the beginning. A his-
torical analogy can be drawn from the Supreme Court's interpreta-
tion of the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Four-
teenth Amendment.3 In The Slaughterhouse Cases' the Court declared
that white butchers were not protected from the state establishment
of a monopoly because these Fourteenth Amendment clauses were
created to protect newly emancipated slaves. 44 Over time the Court
interpreted the plain language of the clauses to include the protec-
tion of other groups, including Americans of Anglo descent. Al-
though perhaps the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment were not
advocated strong central power, expressed his support for a viable state sovereignty and his be-
lief that state power would continue to thrive in our system, in spite of the expansion of na-
tional decision-making authority. See Carol Tebben, Is Federalism a Political Question? An Applica-
tion of the Marshallian Framework to Garcia, 20 PUBLIUS 113 (1990).
41 WALKER, supra note 1, at 62 ("Federalism was thus one more means of achieving republi-
can democracy.").
42 Chief Judge Ernest St. Germain advocates using the term "tribal citizen" rather than
"tribal member," because in his words, "a tribe is not just a private club." Interview with Ernest
St. Germain, ChiefJudge of the Lac du Flambeau Band of Chippewa, at Lac Du Flambeau Res-
ervation, Wis. (July 21, 2002); see also Nell Jessup Newton, Federal Power Over Indians: Its Sources,
Scope, and Limitations, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 195, 196-97 (1984) ("Indian tribes in 'Indian country'
are a good deal more than 'private, voluntary organizations.") (quoting United States v. Mazu-
rie, 419 U.S. 544, 557 (1975)).
" U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
44 The Slaughter House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1873).
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specifically thinking about protecting Anglo-Americans when the
clauses were written, the plain language was inclusive. And although
perhaps the Framers of the Constitution and the Tenth Amendment
were not specifically thinking about tribal sovereignty when the words
were written, the plain and inclusive language identifies tribes as
tribes and people as people.
Historically, there has been in this country a general parochial
disregard for the importance, complexity, diversity, and effectiveness
of tribal cultures and tribal governments. In spite of decades, even
centuries, of misunderstanding and harsh attempts at forced accul-
turation, the resilience of tribal nations, or in some cases tribal bands,
is remarkable. In the words of Professor Monette, the tribes have
been treated as a "federalism football" in American law in clashes of
authority between the States and the national government.45 There
seem to be significant parallels between the gradual evolution of fed-
eral/state relations (federalism) and the evolution of federal/sta-
te/tribal relations (trifederalism), as the Court continues to address
issues of sovereign tribal authority. Gradually over time constitu-
tional provisions, treaties, and constitutional principles have coa-
lesced to create a trifederal structure of American government. The
reserved power of the States as a traditional component of federalism
and the reserved power of the tribal nations as a traditional compo-
nent of federal Indian law have become constitutionally compatible.
III. THE ERRATICJUDICIAL RECOGNITION OF TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY
The Supreme Court of the United States has recognized sovereign
tribal authority on many occasions, lending support to the argument
that tribal nation sovereignty itself is an enduring principle of Ameri-
can jurisprudence. In one case, for example, addressing the appro-
priate jurisdiction of tribal courts, the Court declared, "[i]f state-
court jurisdiction over Indians or activities on Indian lands would in-
terfere with tribal sovereignty and self-government, the state courts
are generally divested ofjurisdiction as a matter of federal law."46 The
Court unfortunately does not always follow its own precedent. Judi-
cial protection of Native sovereignty has been erratic even though the
Court has recognized that tribes have sovereignty as a matter of fed-
eral law, and even though the Court has recognized that tribal na-
tions have constitutional status.
When the Cherokee Nation challenged the authority of the State
of Georgia to have criminal jurisdiction over tribal affairs, the Court
in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia declared that a tribe was a "domestic, de-
45 Monette, supra note 6.
Iowa Mutual Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 15 (1987).
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pendent nation., 4' The Court held that the Cherokee Nation was not
a foreign government,48 a ruling that meaningfully echoed the Com-
merce Clause language that Congress could regulate commerce "with
foreign -Nations... and with the Indian Tribes., 49  The Supreme
Court determined it had no jurisdiction over the issue, and since the
Court did not intervene, the Cherokee in effect lost their challenge
to state power in that case. Tribes were not considered by the Court
to be foreign nations, but rather "domestic nations," and as domestic
nations tribes retained a non-foreign sovereignty. Tribal govern-
ments with their attendant tribal sovereignty were, in a legal sense,
domestic sovereigns within the United States. One ultimate effect of
this decision was to bring tribes within the framework of American
jurisprudence as sovereigns.
One year later in Worcester v. Georgia the Supreme Court stated
that tribal nations were "independent, political communities, retain-
ing their original natural rights," and attempted to protect tribal sov-
ereignty. 5° When the Court declared that the Cherokee Nation did
not fall under the sovereign authority of state government, Chief Jus-
tice Marshall was careful to explain that the relationship of the
United States and the tribes involved the protection of tribes as na-
tions.5'
The Worcester case involved a tug-of-war between the power of the
United States government to create treaties with tribal nations and
the power of a State to interfere with such a treaty and regulate In-
dian country. Was the status of tribal nations within the United States
an issue of relevance in Worcester? Marshall made the issue not only
relevant but one of constitutional relevance when he explained:
The very term "nation," so generally applied to them, means "a people
distinct from others." The constitution, by declaring treaties already
made, as well as those to be made, to be the supreme law of the land, has
adopted and sanctioned the previous treaties with the Indian nations,
and consequently, admits their rank among those powers who are capa-
ble of making treaties.52
47 Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831).
4 Id.
49 U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. The sentiment that tribes are not the equivalent of foreign
governments was expressed by the Court in Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990).
50 Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 559 (1832).
51 See id. at 555, quoted in ROBERT CLINTON ET AL., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW 23 (3d ed. 1991)
("This relation was that of a nation, claiming and receiving the protection of one more power-
ful; not that of individuals abandoning their national character, and submitting as subjects to
the laws of a master."). Marshall also clarified that "[p]rotection does not imply destruction of
the protected," and stated that "[a] weak state, in order to provide for its safety, may place itself
under the protection of one more powerful, without stripping itself of the right of government,
and ceasing to be a state." Id. at 552, 561.
52 Worcester, 31 U.S. at 559; CLINTON, supra note 51, at 24:
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Marshall clarifies that the Constitution has adopted and sanctioned
treaties, and that the Constitution admits53 the rank of nation for Na-
tive tribes.54 Here the Supreme Court asserts explicitly that the Con-
stitution acknowledges tribes as nations.
The Court in Worcester declared Georgia's law to be a violation of
treaties, federal law, and the Constitution of the United States. To
put the language of Cherokee Nation and Worcester together, tribes are
domestic independent (or sovereign), political communities (or na-
tions), retaining their original natural rights, with dependence upon
the national government for protection. The Court's attempt to pro-
tect tribal sovereign authority became a pyrrhic judicial victory for the
tribe in Worcester when President Andrew Jackson's refusal to enforce
the decision of the Court and implementation of the congressional
Removal Act 55 caused thousands of Native people to die when forced
from tribal homelands. The precedent of Supreme Court recogni-
tion of sovereign tribal authority and constitutional status for tribal
nations had been established, and since the time of the decision in
Worcester, the Court has been awkwardly and inconsistently refereeing
judicial contests between national, state and tribal nation sovereignty,
without calling it trifederalism. The Court has not, however, paid at-
tention to Marshall's declaration that tribes have constitutional status
as nations.
In more recent cases, the Court has continued to acknowledge the
sovereignty of tribal nations by stating, for example, "Indian tribes are
unique aggregations possessing attributes of sovereignty over both
their members and their territory. " 6 When addressing a conflict be-
tween state and tribal authority on the issue of gaming, the Court rea-
soned, "[t]he inquiry is to proceed in light of traditional notions of
Indian sovereignty and the congressional goal of Indian self-
government. The Court in a variety of cases has indicated for us
what some of these "traditional notions" are, and Judge Diana Mur-
phy has identified several of these, including the power to:
[Marshall further explained that] the words 'treaty' or 'nation' are words of our own
language, selected in our diplomatic and legislative proceedings, by ourselves, having
each a definite and well understood meaning. We have applied them to Indians, as we
have applied them to the other nations of the earth. They are applied to all in the same
sense.
53 See WEBSTER'S II NEW COLLEGE DICTIONARY 15 (1995) (defining "admit" as "to permit to
exercise certain rights, functions, or privileges... [t]o acknowledge... [t]o concede as true or
valid"); BETIY KIRKPATRICK, THE CASSEIL CONCISE ENGLISH DICTIONARY 17 (1992) (defining
"admit" as "to accept as valid ... to acknowledge").
With many tribal nation/United States treaties still in effect, the Constitution continues to
sanction treaties, and still acknowledges tribes as nations.
55 Act of May 28, 1830, ch. 148.4 Stat. 411 (1830).
56 United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 557 (1975).
57 California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 216 (1987).
[Vol. 5:2
TRYEERALISM AD TRIBAL NATIONS
(1) Make substantive laws to regulate internal affairs,58
(2) Create tribal court systems,
(3) Set tribal membership requirements, °
(4) Set criminal penalties for tribal members,
(5) Impose sales tax upon transactions occurring on the reserva-
tion, 62
(6) Tax oil and gas extraction on the reservation, 6 6
(7) Tax non-Indian leasehold interests on the reservation,8
(8) Resolve internal disputes in a tribal forum. 65
In addition to these, the Court has held that a tribal government
must waive sovereign immunity before being subject to suit by a
State, '6 that a tribe and the national government are two distinct sov-
ereigns who can each prosecute the same case without violating dou-
ble jeopardy, 67 and that neither the protections of the federal Bill of
Rights, nor the Fourteenth Amendment, limit tribal governments.6
This discussion of the attributes of sovereignty is not meant to be ex-
haustive, but rather is offered by way of example. It is not within the
scope of this Comment to identify the character and extent of tribal
sovereignty, but rather to clarify the constitutional, judicial and legis-
lative acknowledgment of its existence.
Cases involving issues of tribal sovereignty are now commonplace
in the caseload of the Supreme Court, addressing questions such as
tribal self-determination,69 tribal court versus state court jurisdiction
over Indian children,70 tribal court versus federal court jurisdiction,'
and tribal-state disputes over gaming.7 Although this discussion em-
Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376 (1896).
Roffv. Burney, 168 U.S. 218 (1897).
61 United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978).
Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Coleville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134
(1980).
63 Merrion v.Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130 (1982).
Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Navajo Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 195 (1985).
65 Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959). All of the sources in notes 58-65 are discussed in
Diana Murphy, Developing Cooperative Relationships Between Tribal and Federal Courts, Ad-
dress Before the 23rd Annual Federal Bar Association Indian Law Conference (Apr. 2-3, 1998).
This list represents a paraphrasing of her article.
66 Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Okla. 498 U.S. 505
(1991).
67 United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978).
SeeTalton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376 (1896); Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 242 (1833).
ff Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
70 Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30 (1989).
71 Nat'l Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845 (1985). A cogent
discussion of this case and others addressing tribal-federal court jurisdictional disputes is found
in Judith V. Royster, Stature and Scrutiny: Post-Exhaustion Review of Tribal Court Decisions, 46 U.
KAN. L. REV. 241 (1998).
72 See California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 216 (1987).
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phasizes a few of the notable cases in which the Court has been will-
ing to respect the domestic sovereignty of tribal America, there have
been many cases in which the Court has ignored or diminished that
sovereignty. Why is tribal sovereignty at times given judicial protec-
tion and at other times ignored? Why are tribal governments at times
considered within the structure of American government and at
other times excluded?
The Supreme Court asserted in Worcester that tribes have constitu-
tional acknowledgment as nations, yet it has ignored rather than
honored that precedent and the language of the Constitution. Philip
Frickey maintains that the Court has been "divesting" sovereign tribal
authority, particularly jurisdiction over nonmembers of the tribe and
over tribal land, by the creation of federal common law in Indian af-1 4
fairs. Apart from congressional regulation of Native affairs, the
Court has made its own judicial policy destructive of tribal self-
government. Frickey declares that "it is the Court, not Congress, that
has exercised front-line responsibility for the vast erosion of tribal
sovereignty." 5 Professor Frickey's elucidation of the hostile judicial
environment for tribal authority may seem to clash with a call for the
Court to continue to honor the fact that tribal nations have constitu-
tional acknowledgment according to precedent. However, his analy-
sis and the work done by other scholars, renders the longstanding
need for judicial constancy even more compelling. Fidelity to consti-
tutional language and to precedent clarifying the constitutional status
of tribal nations would lessen the Court's inconsistency in federal In-
dian law cases and rein judicial attempts to further erode tribal sover-
eign authority.
Native tribes are acknowledged by the Constitution as nations,
and the Supreme Court has recognized the constitutional status of
tribal nations when interpreting the powers of the national govern-
ment and the reserved powers of the States. It is reasonable to pro-
pose that tribes merit a continued judicial recognition of their consti-
tutional status as tribal nations.
IV. IF THE TRIBES, WHY NOT LOCAL GOVERNMENTS?
If tribal nations are constitutionally recognized as limited sover-
eigns within a trifederal structure of American government, why are
local governments not included? Local governments hold a vital
73 For a detailed analysis of several federal Indian law cases, especially those that have been
detrimental to tribal sovereignty, see WILKINS, supra note 12.
74 Philip P. Frickey, A Common Law for Our Age of Colonialism: The Judicial Divestiture of Indian
Tribal Authority over Nonmembers, 109 YALE L.J. 1 (1999).
75 Id. at 7.
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place in the structure of American government as democracy in ac-
tion at a level close to the people. For purposes of the Constitution,
however, the Supreme Court has clarified the status of local govern-
ments to involve the creation and extension of state power. A com-
mon kind of example would be Miranda v. Arizona, in which a local
police officer failed to inform the defendant of his right to remain si-
lent and right to an attorney. The Court held the local Phoenix po-
lice officer's "failure to inform" to be state action for purposes of
Fourteenth Amendment application. 76 The officer, as a member of
local government, was acting on behalf of the State of Arizona.
More to the point, in Reynolds v. Sims, 77 the State of Alabama ar-
gued that the relationship of county governments to the State was
analogous to the relationship of the States to the national govern-
ment. Alabama wanted to predicate state senate representation on
the basis of one senator from each county, without any consideration
of the difference in county populations, because it claimed that this
method was similar to the constitutional provision allowing each State
to have two United States senators regardless of size. The Court dis-
agreed, holding that state senatorial districts must be roughly equal
in population size, even though population is not a relevant factor for
representation in the United States Senate. In explaining its reason-
ing for treating local governments differently than the States, the
Court observed that:
Admittedly, the original 13 States surrendered some of their sovereignty
in agreeing to join together "to form a more perfect Union." But at the
heart of our constitutional system remains the concept of separate and
distinct governmental entities which have delegated some, but not all, of
their formerly held powers to the single national government .... Politi-
cal subdivisions of States-counties, cities, or whatever-never were or
never have been considered as sovereign entities. Rather, they have been
traditionally regarded as subordinate governmental instrumentalities
created b~ the State to assist in the carrying out of state governmental
functions.
The Court reasoned that while States were sovereign entities predat-
ing the national government created by the Constitution, county gov-
ernments, which were created by state law, were at no time sovereign.
Local governments receive constitutional recognition and status only
indirectly through the constitutional recognition of the State. The
States have not been required by the national government to recog-
nize or honor the sovereignty of local governments, as they have been
required to recognize and honor the sovereignty of tribal nations.
76 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
7 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
Id. at 574-75.
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The statement by the Supreme Court in Reynolds is also relevant to
this discussion in another way. Not only does it point out how local
and county governments are not like States because they are created
by the States, but it also alludes to how tribes and States are alike in
the sense that both predate the government of the United States, and
both have surrendered some, but not all, power to the national gov-
ernment. Local governments do not independently participate in a
constitutional tripartite federalism composed of the national, state,
and tribal governments, except, for purposes of the Constitution, as
extensions of the state governments.
Tribal governments are sovereigns, with sovereignty similar in
many respects to the sovereignty of the United States government
and the States. Attempts to identify tribal nations as governments
similar to local, municipal, or county governments are inaccurate and
a death knell to sovereignty.
V. PLENARY POWER OF CONGRESS OVER INDIAN COUNTRY?
A major barrier to joining the discussions of national, state and
tribal sovereignty into one has been the dubious doctrine of "con-
gressional plenary power over Indian affairs." Congress has ostensibly
seized control of American Indian affairs under its Commerce Clause
power. For example, early legislation known as "Trade Acts" cur-
tailed liberty in Indian country, including limitations on movement
and free speech. 7
The Supreme Court has paid great deference to congressional
control over tribal governments, upholding a long line of statutory
attempts at de-Indianization, or forced acculturation. In addition to
the early Trade Acts, congressional policy on removal from tribal
homelands,80 the mandated break up of tribal lands into individual
allotments,81 renegation of treaty rights," and forced termination of
federal-tribal relations3 all fell allegedly under the power of Congress
to regulate commerce with tribal America. These actions were the
products of an explicit and concerted effort to assimilate Native peo-
ples into the American mainstream by the destruction of Native cul-
tures and Native governments. This forced acculturation model has
not been obliterated, yet congressional policies toward Indian coun-
try have at times attempted to support tribal autonomy, and in spite
Act ofJan. 17, 1800, ch. 5, 2 Stat. 6 (1800).
so Act of May 28, 1830, ch. 148, 4 Stat. 411 (1830).
81 Indian General Allotment Act, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (1887).
Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903).
M H.R. Con. Res. 108, 83d Cong., 67 Stat. B132 (1953).
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of the record of heavy congressional legislation, tribal nations still re-
tain some sovereign authority recognized by Congress.
There has been a great deal of judicial lip service paid to an idea
of congressional plenary power over tribal affairs. The Court's com-
mon deference to congressional authority over Native peoples lacks
constitutional foundation, since the words of the Commerce Clause
do not plainly authorize it. The Commerce Clause does bestow ex-
plicit authority upon Congress to regulate "commerce ... with the
Indian Tribes. Congress seems to have taken this authority and
with judicial approval expanded it to include other tribal issues in
addition to commerce.8 5 The constitutional basis for congressional
plenary power over tribal governments outside the realm of commerce is
vulnerable to challenge.
Legal scholar Frank Pommersheim discussed the Lone Wolf case, 6
in which the Supreme Court declared that Congress could abrogate a
federal/tribal treaty based on its power to regulate Indian affairs, as a
primary example of the plenary power doctrine. Pommersheim ob-
served that
[t] he plenary power doctrine--without any constitutional mooring-rati-
fied the absorption of Indian tribes physically and politically into the na-
tional republic and assigned complete authority over this third sovereign
to the United States Congress. All this was accomplished by extraordi-
nary evasiveness. In other words, the "need" for ongoing federal hegem-
ony trumped any concern or necessity for constitutional integrity. The
brutal effect[s] of Lone Wolf [were] both to strip tribes of their constitu-
tional status and to make their sovereignty subject to the unconstrained
(and extra-constitutional) authority of the federal government.
88
Citing the lack of an adequate constitutional reference for congres-
sional plenary power over tribal sovereignty,8 Professor Pommer-
sheim does make a significant point. Constitutional integrity is lack-
ing in our present-day assessment of the place of tribal governments
within the framework of American government. The words of the
Constitution do not justify a congressional plenary authority over
tribal nations. In addition, an ongoing judicial acknowledgment that
84 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
85 See Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 192 (1989) ("[T]he central
function of the Indian Commerce Clause is to provide Congress with plenary power to legislate
in the area of Indian affairs."). This extensive interpretation of congressional power over In-
dian affairs was echoed in Attorney General Janet Reno's 1999 Policy on Indian Sovereignty and
Government-to-Government Relations with Indian Tribes that asserts that, although tribes are sover-
eign domestic nations, congressional control over Indian affairs is complete. U.S. Dep't of Jus-
tice, supra note 20.
Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903).
87 Pommersheim, supra note 36.
Id. at 320 (internal citations omitted).
8 Id. at 320 n.29.
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three constitutionally recognized limited sovereigns participate in a
tangible trifederalism would be the epitome of constitutional integ-
rity. This kind of acknowledgment of the constitutional status of
tribal nations, well grounded in constitutional language, Marshall
precedent, and the constitutionally sanctioned treaty process, would
provide Congress and the judicial system with some guidance in pro-
tecting, and some limitation in diminishing, sovereign tribal author-
ity.
Although the Supreme Court at times has recognized that Con-
gress has a plenary power to regulate Indian affairs, at the same time
it has also often recognized the existence of tribal sovereign author-
ity. In deciding that tribal nations had the authority to establish their
own membership criteria, the Court recognized that "proper respect
both for tribal sovereignty itself and for the plenary authority of Con-
gress in this area cautions that we tread lightly in the absence of clear
indications of legislative intent. '' 0
For the Court there seems to be no contradiction in the contem-
poraneous existence of both the doctrine of "congressional plenary
authority over Indian affairs" and the doctrine of "tribal sovereignty."
In the Court's view, these doctrines are not mutually exclusive, any
more than "congressional plenary power over commerce" and "state
sovereignty" are mutually exclusive doctrines. The troubling aspect
of this comparison between States and tribes, however, is that States
are commonly recognized as having some sovereign power outside
the realm of commerce that Congress does not have constitutional
authority to regulate. The Supreme Court has been reluctant to rec-
ognize, or more accurately reluctant to continue to recognize, that
tribes have some sovereign power outside the realm of commerce
that Congress does not have constitutional authority to regulate. The
Supreme Court has never declared that tribal nations possess no sov-
ereign right to self-government, and Congress itself has recognized
and continues to recognize the existence of sovereign tribal author-
ity.
VI. THE TRAIL TO UNITED STATES CITIZENSHIP
A corollary to the issue of congressional plenary power over tribal
self-government is the question of the source of United States citizen-
ship for people who belong to a tribe. Does Congress retain the
power to revoke United States citizenship for the peoples of Native
America? The evolution of United States citizenship status for indi-
viduals who are also tribal citizens is a critical element in understand-
ing the constitutional status of tribal nations within the structure of
W Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 60 (1978).
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American government. The trail to American citizenship has been
painful, complicated, and even brutal, marked by government decep-
tion, broken promises, removal from homelands, and the slaughter
of loved ones.' It is understandable that from the perspective of
tribal members, citizenship in a newly-formed alien democracy was
probably not a preferred destination.
When the Constitution was created, indigenous peoples were ex-
cluded from the concept of "We the People of the United States."9
A primary reason for the exclusion of tribal members from the popu-
lation of the United States, a reason with significant relevance to this
discussion, was that tribal nations were separate sovereigns, each with
its own distinct cultural and political heritage. In Article I of the
Constitution, this exclusion was made explicit with the provision that
"Indians not taxed," or tribal members, were not to be included in
the population count for the purpose of determining representation
in the House of Representatives. The exclusion of tribal members
was also attributable to the attitudes of those actively creating the new
nation. People of Native ancestry were referred to as "savages" and
were considered to be inferior by the Eurocentric colonists who un-
derstood little of tribal ways. 4 Even those who tended to be more
generous in their acceptance of Native customs, some with unselfish
motivation, usually did so as a temporary expedient to entice assimila-
tion for purposes such as religious conversion or establishing trade. 95
The contrast in goals has been great between people of African
ancestry who have sought assimilation into the mainstream of Ameri-
can life and people of indigenous ancestry who have sought to main-
tain the inherent right of self-government rather than assimilation.
Yet, the history of the exclusion of people of African descent from
citizenship under the Constitution has relevance to the exclusion of
tribal members. For African Americans, explicit inclusion as United
States citizens came first through congressional legislation and later
through constitutional amendment.
96
In 1857, Dred Scott appealed to the Supreme Court for a declara-
tion of his freedom from slavery and a recognition of his status as a
United States citizen. The Court rejected Scott's arguments, declar-
91 See DEE BROWN, BURY MY HEART AT WOUNDED KNEE: AN INDIAN HISTORY OF THE
AMERICAN WEST (1970).
92 U.S. CONST. pmbl.
93 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3.
94 Robert B. Porter, The Demise of the Ongwehoweh, and the Rise of the Native Americans: Redress-
ing the Genocidal Act of Forcing American Citizenship upon Indigenous Peoples, 15 HARV. BLACKLETER
L.J. 107 (1999).
95 Peter d'Errico, American Indian Sovereignty: Now You See It, Now You Don't, Inaugural
Lecture at Humboldt State University (Oct. 27, 1999).
96 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (1866).
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ing that slaves were "property" and that Negroes (slave or free) were
not citizens of the United States.97 The decision displayed constitu-
tional contortionism because the Constitution did not exclude peo-
ple of African descent from citizenship, and many free blacks had
participated in the ratification of the Constitution. The Court's dec-
laration, however, made exclusion from citizenship under the Consti-
tution a reality. Less than a decade later, after the country experi-
enced a bitter, divisive, and deadly civil war, Congress gave its
response to the narrow and exclusive interpretation of citizenship
announced in the Dred Scott case.
In the Civil Rights Act of 1866, Congress declared that all persons
born in the United States, and subject to its jurisdiction, were citizens
of the United States.99 Like the Constitution, the Act explicitly ex-
cluded Indians who were not taxed, or in other words, people who
were affiliated with tribal nations. At the time the law was written, the
United States was still making treaties with tribal nations as inde-
pendent sovereigns. In addition, most members of Congress exhib-
ited a parochial disdain and disregard for matters tribal. Members of
Congress freely used descriptive words such as "wild" and "uncivi-
lized" in references to the people of indigenous nations, while the
United States military continued to apply and threaten brutality to
gain control of Native peoples and their land.' °°
In 1866, Congress proposed the Fourteenth Amendment, which
was ratified by the States in 1868. With the declaration that "All per-
sons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the juris-
diction thereof, are citizens of the United States,"' ' the first clause of
the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment was a reaction to the
Court's decision in Dred Scott, just as the Civil Rights Act of 1866 had
been. This amendment contained no explicit exclusion for "Indians
not taxed," but by its actions Congress clearly expressed its assump-
tion that loyalty to a tribe disqualified a person for United States citi-
zenship. After ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress
authoritatively and unilaterally continued to bestow citizenship upon
tribal members without reference to the amendment, just as it had
done before the amendment was adopted. In many cases, Congress
would bestow citizenship upon the members of an entire tribe at one
time.)° A Native person was granted citizenship by Congress for a va-
97 Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 451-52 (1857).
9 Id. at 577 (Curtis, J., dissenting).
:" Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (1866).
00 JOHN EHLE, TRAIL OF TEARS: THE RISE AND FALL OF THE CHEROKEE NATION 273 (1988).
101 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 1.
10 See Stockbridge-Munsee Band of Mohicans, March 1871, 16 Stat. 406 (allowing members
of Stockbridge and Munsee Tribes to become citizens); Act of Feb. 6, 1871, 16 Stat. 361 (allow-
ing Winnebagos residing in Minnesota to become citizens through an application process);
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riety of reasons including such explicitly recognized justifications as
acceptance of the break-up of tribal lands and adopting habits of
"civilized life;"'0' 3 service in the military, especially for being wounded
in battle; and even conversion to Christianity.'O' All of these actions
signified that, from the congressional perspective tribal members
were not considered American citizens under the Fourteenth
Amendment.
In general, members of Congress assumed that loyalty to tribe and
loyalty to the United States were mutually exclusive. During the
1800's, the granting of citizenship status was often predicated upon a
unilateral congressional assumption that tribal affiliation had been
relinquished. At times this trade-off between United States citizen-
ship and relinquishment of tribal loyalty was stipulated by treaty,05 al-
though little evidence has been presented to indicate that relin-
quishment was actually the understanding and intention of tribal
leaders. Treaties were written in English, which the people of tribal
nations often did not speak or read. Tribes were pressured, even
forced, into agreement with treaty terms thrust upon tribal leaders.07
It is clear that the parties to a tribal nation/United States treaty did
not possess equal bargaining power, especially in terms of size and
military strength.
Only three years after the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted,
with its implied exclusion of Native individuals because of tribal loy-
alty, Congress forbade the making of any new treaties with tribal na-
tions.0 8 These conflicting actions of Congress demonstrated the con-
fusion about the relationship of the tribes and tribal peoples to the
United States. On one hand, tribes were treated as if they were for-
eign countries through the exclusion of tribal members from citizen-
ship under the Fourteenth Amendment; yet on the other, tribes were
no longer treated as nations for treaty making purposes. The under-
lying objective of members of Congress, reflected clearly in congres-
sional legislation and rhetoric of the time, was the assimilation of
people of indigenous ancestry into the mainstream of American
life.' °9 But if assimilation was the goal at that time, why not bring it
about by granting citizenship to every Native person at once? The
congressional strategy instead seemed to be, "first become like us,
Treaty with the Senecas, Feb. 23, 1867, 15 Stat. 513 (allowing Peorias, Kaskaskias, Weas, and
Piankeshaws to voluntarily become citizens).
103 Indian General Allotment Act, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (1887); Porter, supranote 94, at 123.
04 Porter, supra note 94, at 108-09.
105 Elkv. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94, 98-99 (1884).
106 Id. at 94.
107 See BROWN, supra note 91; Porter, supra note 94.
108 Act of Mar. 3, 1871, ch. 120, 16 Stat. 544 (1871).
109 See Porter, supra note 94, at 120-25.
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then you may become a citizen." Thus, a companion goal of assimila-
tion was the destruction of tribal nations.
The congressional assumption that tribal members were excluded
from citizenship under the Fourteenth Amendment was supported by
the Supreme Court in the case of Elk v. Wilkins."° John Elk, an indi-
vidual who had been born a member of the Cherokee Nation, ap-
pealed to the Supreme Court for a declaration that he was a citizen of
the United States so that he could vote. The laws of Nebraska stated
that a man who had reached the age of twenty-one could vote if he
were a citizen of the United States and a resident of Nebraska. De-
nied the right to vote because he was Cherokee, Mr. Elk argued that
his birth within the boundaries of the United States and his disasso-
ciation from tribal life to become completely subject to the jurisdic-
tion of the United States qualified him for citizenship under the
Fourteenth Amendment. Although John Elk's desire for United
States citizenship at the expense of tribal loyalty may not be represen-
tative of the majority of tribal members, his case does clarify the Su-
preme Court's interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The
Court reasoned that tribal membership and United States citizenship
were mutually exclusive. They even went further to say that because
he was a tribal member at the time of his birth, he could only become
a citizen of the United States as an adult by naturalization at the
hands of Congress."' The Court compared him to the child of a for-
eign ambassador, who, although technically within the boundaries of
the United States, is considered to be a citizen only of his parents'
country. Since Mr. Elk, by this decision of the Supreme Court, was
not a citizen of the United States under the Fourteenth Amendment,
his right to vote in Nebraska could be denied according to state law.
The Fifteenth Amendment, which prohibited States from denying the
right to vote based upon race, did not protect him because he was
not considered to be a United States citizen."'
In his dissent, Justice Harlan argued that the Fourteenth Amend-
ment did confer citizenship upon a person born to a tribe within the
United States who later renounced tribal loyalty. Even though Justice
Harlan disagreed with the Court about the application of the Four-
teenth Amendment to John Elk, he did agree with the Court's rea-
soning that a person could not at the same time be loyal to both the
United States and his tribal nation. For Justice Harlan as well as the
majority of the Court, the Fourteenth Amendment did not confer
110 112 U.S. at 109.
II The court compared Mr. Elk to the child of a foreign ambassador, who although techni-
cally born within the boundaries of the United States, is considered to be only a citizen of his
parents' country. Id. at 102.
112 U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1.
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American citizenship upon a person at the time of birth if that per-
son was born as a member of a tribe.113
The Court in Elk v. Wilkins seemed to equate birth in Indian coun-
try with birth in a nation that was foreign to the United States.
Though it commented in the case that tribes were not foreign, in the
decision a tribe was defined as an "alien" nation, and tribal members
were considered to be like "other foreigners" and "other foreign
people." 114 More than fifty years before, the Supreme Court had spe-
cifically declared that tribes were not "foreign" in the Cherokee Nation
case. There the Court had stated that tribes were not foreign nations,
"not, we presume, because a tribe may not be a nation, but because it
is not foreign to the United States."" The Court in the Cherokee Na-
tion case had declared tribes to be domestic nations, clearing the trail
for a dual loyalty concept. In Elk v. Wilkins, however, there was no
indication of the possibility of dual loyalty to both tribal nation and
the United States. Birth within a tribe made the Fourteenth
Amendment inapplicable, and was grounds for the denial of Ameri-
can citizenship even when an individual rescinded tribal loyalty.
116
Tribal affiliation and United States citizenship would not be officially
recognized as compatible for at least forty years after Elk v. Wilkins.
A significant number of men from indigenous nations had been
willing to fight (and die) in World War I, receiving recognition for
unselfish service with the offer of American citizenship."' When
Congress chose to pass the Citizenship Act of 1924, unilaterally con-
ferring citizenship upon all people of Indian country,"' approxi-
mately two-thirds of the members of tribal nations already had been
granted citizenship status." 9 The bestowal of citizenship in this legis-
lation was unilateral in the sense that Congress did not ask individu-
als affected by the law whether they desired United States citizenship.
Tuscarora Chief Clinton Rickard, who had been active in attempting
to block passage of the Citizenship Act of 1924, declared after its pas-
sage: "The Citizenship Act did pass in 1924 despite our strong opposi-
tion. By its provisions all Indians were automatically made United
States citizens whether they wanted to be or not. This was a violation
of our sovereignty. Our citizenship was in our own nations. 1 2 0 There
are negative aspects to American citizenship for tribal members. One
113 Elk, 112 U.S. at 110-11 (Harlan,J., dissenting).
114 Id. at 100-01.
115 Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 19 (1831).
116 Elk, 112 U.S. at 102.
17 See Daniel McCool, Indian Voting, in AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY
105 (Vine Deloria,Jr. ed., 1985); see also Porter, supra note 94, at 127-33.
118 Citizenship to Indians Act of 1924, ch. 233, 43 Stat. 253 (1924).
119 McCool, supra note 117, at 105.
120 Porter, supra note 94, at 128.
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of the most significant concerns for those who cherish the perpetua-
tion of tribal culture and self-government is that acculturation to
mainstream American values poses the threat of a corresponding loss
of tribal identity and autonomy. Author Robert Porter considers the
imposition of citizenship upon indigenous peoples without request or
approval to be a "genocidal act," causing a disintegration of tribal na-
tions.121 What better way to destroy another culture, or a great num-
ber of other cultures, than to invite the people of these cultures to
become part of your own? In the case of Native peoples, though,
United States citizenship was not contingent upon the relinquish-
ment of tribal membership, so tribal nations have continued to exist
after the granting of citizenship status.
The lack of grammatical rigor in the Citizenship Act of 1924 left
open the question of whether tribal members were being naturalized
by Congress, or alternatively if all people born as members of tribal
nations would now be born as citizens of the United States. Congress
gave some clarification to the previous act with passage of the Na-
tionality Act of 1940 by declaring in part, "[t] he following shall be na-
tionals and citizens of the United States at birth: ... (b) A person
born in the United States to a member of an Indian, Eskimo, Aleu-
tian, or other aboriginal tribe."'2 Still, other ambiguities remained.
Was Congress the source of citizenship status because it determined
the citizenship of tribal members by passing legislation? Or had the
Fourteenth Amendment, by declaring that all persons born in the
United States are citizens at birth, become the basis of this status? If
Congress remained the source, did Congress retain the power to
withdraw American citizenship from indigenous peoples at any time?
These questions remain unanswered by the courts today.
If Congress did retain the power to revoke indigenous citizenship,
then there exists a two-tiered citizenship in the United States-one
tier for people with tribal affiliation protected only by a law of Con-
gress, and a second tier for all other people protected by the Consti-
tution. There are at least four factors that point to the Fourteenth
Amendment as the source of citizenship for Native American Indians.
First, Indians are not excluded from the Fourteenth Amendment.
Second, it has become accepted by Congress, the President, and the
Supreme Court that a person who so chooses can be loyal to both a
tribal nation and the United States. Third, relinquishment of tribal
citizenship was not required in congressional recognition of the
American citizenship of tribal members by Congress in the Citizen-
ship Act of 1924."' Fourth, a two-tiered system of citizenship status
121 Id. at 165.
12 Nationality Act of 1940, ch. 876, § 201, 54 Stat. 1137, 1138 (1940).
123 Citizenship Act of 1924, ch. 253, 43 Stat. 253 (1924); McCool, supra note 117, at 107.
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would be antithetical to the constitutional principle of equal treat-
ment under the law.124 The language of the Fourteenth Amendment
stating that "[a]ll persons born or naturalized in the United States
and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United
States" does seem to apply forcefully to protect the United States citi-
zenship of Native American people." Thus, the Citizenship Act of
1924 seems to have triggered application of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment Citizenship Clause to the people of tribal nations, a protection
not subject to congressional control.
When the Fourteenth Amendment declared that those born in
the United States were citizens of the United States, it also added,
"and of the State wherein they reside." Are people who are affiliated
with a tribe, many of whom live on reserved tribal land or land held
in trust for a tribe, also citizens of the State in which the tribe is lo-
cated? In some cases, States have been slow to accept this idea, using
a variety of justifications for withholding state citizenship status. The
constitutional declaration that "Indians not taxed" were to be ex-
cluded for purposes of population count to determine state represen-
tation in the House of Representatives served as one justification.
126
After indigenous people became recognized as citizens of the United
States, however, tribal members living on tribal land began to be in-
cluded for purposes of population count, thereby increasing a State's
political power in Congress. One federal judge asserted in 1927 that
Indians, based upon United States citizenship and residency in the
State, were state citizens.127
The status of tribes as separate domestic sovereigns, not usually
falling under the jurisdiction of state governments, provided States
with another argument to justify the exclusion of tribal members
from state citizenship. In 1975, Bruce Babbitt, as Arizona Attorney
General, clarified the relationship of tribal members to the State by
observing, "[w]hat I think is safely established now is the principle
that Indians can retain their sovereignty and their separateness po-
litically from state governments, and at the same time, participate
with full rights.
128
The status of United States citizen has not automatically included
the right to vote, and many States have denied the franchise to tribal
members who desired to exercise this right, including Arizona,
Idaho, Maine, Mississippi, New Mexico, North Dakota, South Dakota,
124 U.S. CONST. amend. V; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
125 U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
126 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2.
17 Deere v. New York, 22 F.2d 851 (N.D.N.Y. 1927), quoted in McCool, supra note 117, at 107.
128 McCool, supra note 117, at 114.
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Utah, and Washington.' 29 In one example, four years after the con-
gressional recognition of United States citizenship for tribal Ameri-
cans, the Arizona Supreme Court decided that United States citizen-
ship did not include the right to vote in that State.29 This decision
seemed to ignore the Fifteenth Amendment, ratified in 1870, which
prohibits the States and the federal government from denying the
right to vote on account of race for a person who is otherwise quali-
fied to vote. 3'
The right of the people of Native America to vote in state and
federal elections has generally become honored in all States, and po-
litical science researchers have begun to study the impact of voting by
tribal members in these elections. 32 Not a great deal of research has
been completed, and data is difficult to gather since voting is done by
secret ballot, yet the studies demonstrate that such political participa-
tion is on the increase and tribal members under certain conditions
can have a significant influence, especially upon the outcome of state
and local elections. 3
The historical proposition that tribal citizens were not also United
States citizens under the Fourteenth Amendment contributed to the
overall confusion about whether tribes were part of the United States
as domestic sovereigns. This proposition also led to confusion over
whether tribal sovereign rights were a constitutional issue. A basic
premise of trifederalism is that the people of tribal America are si-
multaneously subject to three limited sovereigns, with the freedom to
participate in elections as citizens of the tribe, the State,' 34 and the
United States. The perspective that people could be loyal to three
sovereigns within the United States has gained gradual acceptance by
Congress and the Court, clearing the way for tribal citizenship to be
constitutionally compatible with United States and state citizenship.
19 Id. at 106-116.
10 Porter v. Hall, 271 P. 411 (Ariz. 1928). This decision was reminiscent of the 1875 Minor v.
Happersett decision, in which the Supreme Court declared that although women were citizens of
the United States, this status did not give women the right to vote. Any State that chose to do so
had the constitutional authority to deny women the right to vote until passage of the Nine-
teenth Amendment in 1920. See Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162 (1875).
131 U.S. CONST. amend. XV.
132 SeeJeff J. Corntassel & Richard C. Witmer II, American Indian Tribal Government Support of
Office-Seekers from the 1994 Election, 34 SOC. SCI. J. 511 (1997); McCool, supra note 117. This
scholarship may also have implications for the substantiation of a constitutional trifederal
framework; however, there is no evidence that the authors have intended such a purpose.
13 If an election is a relatively close one and if the tribe votes as a bloc, then voting power is
correspondingly increased. McCool, supra note 117, at 129.
134 A discussion of tribal youth council members acting as pages in the New Mexico State
Legislature observed, "[a] ssisting their District Senator, Arthur Rodarte, members were able to
see and experience their state government at work firsthand." ficarilla Apache Tribal Youth Coun-
cil Conducts Government Project, UNRY NEWS (United National Indian Tribal Youth, Inc.), Sum-
mer 2000, at 7.
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The idea of triple citizenship has been expressed by a number of
people in Indian country, particularly those who actively participate
in tribal, state, and national elections.' According to law professor
Robert Porter, "While there are no official statistics on the number of
Indians who reject their American citizenship, it is likely that only a
few would identify themselves solely as citizens of their own Indige-
nous nation."' 6 This assumption is supported by research conducted
with tribal court judges and tribal court personnel in Wisconsin, in
which an overwhelming number of those interviewed identified
themselves as citizens of their tribe, the State of Wisconsin, and the
United States.137
It would be significant discrimination against Native American to
maintain the doctrine that Congress retains the power to withdraw
citizenship from a specific group of people based solely upon alle-
giance to tribal self-government. A doctrine of trifederalism stands in
contrast to the proposition that Congress possesses the delegated
constitutional authority to withdraw United States citizenship from
Native peoples, and its corollary proposition that the United States
has a two-tier system of national citizenship among its people-one
tier protected by the Fourteenth Amendment and the other pro-
tected only by congressional legislation. The theory of a three-
sovereign government under the Constitution encompasses the prin-
ciple of constitutionally recognized citizenship for all Americans, with
a category of subcitizenship for no one. Tribal citizens are deserving
of full participation as state and national citizens, with the right to re-
tain domestic sovereign tribal nation status.
The offer by the United States government of American citizen-
ship for tribal members has brought with it the corresponding re-
sponsibility to recognize tribal nations as part of the constitutional
13 Tricitizenship is sometimes recognized in Indian law scholarship. See, e.g., WILKINS, supra
note 12, at 5:
More importantly, this discussion leads to a larger issue of why the core democratic con-
cepts of fairness, justice, and consent of the governed have not yet been fully realized for
tribal nations and their citizens despite clearly pronounced treaty rights, federal policies
of Indian self-determination and tribal self-governance, positive judicial precedents, and
a triple citizenship.
See also Monette, supra note 8, at 630 n.83:
As tribal citizenship seems to have evolved over time into citizenship of the Union and
possibly, if problematically, of the [SItates, one must address the improbable issues of
whether tribal members can be citizens of two "independent" sovereigns, Union and
tribe, or three overlapping sovereigns, Union, [S]tate, and tribe, with all the attendant
rights and responsibilities.
136 Porter, supra note 94, at 140.
137 Tricitizenship was the dominant perspective expressed in interviews with tribal judges and
court personnel in Wisconsin, although tribal citizenship was often expressed as the most im-
portant of the three. A minute percentage of those interviewed expressed the perspective of a
single citizenship, or allegiance to the tribe alone. Carol Tebben, Trifederalism in Wisconsin
(2001) (sabbatical research project, on file with author).
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structure of American government. Enveloping tribal members as
American citizens also involves enveloping tribal nations within the
structure of American government. The constitutional protection of
American citizenship for people who are also tribal citizens includes
the constitutional protection of the inherent right to live as tribal na-
tions. This inclusion of tribal citizens into the body politic as citizens
of the United States represents another component of the inclusion
of tribal governments into the overall structure of American govern-
ment. Tricitizenship provides yet another linkage to clarify the con-
stitutional status of sovereign domestic tribal nations, a clarification
indicating nations within a nation.
By providing greater stability, prosperity, and opportunities to ex-
pand tribal authority, American citizenship also has the potential to
act as an expedient to assist tribal nations in gaining a more complete
self-government. Possibly the most positive aspect of federal citizen-
ship may be an increased power to strengthen tribal autonomy, tribal
separateness, and tribal independence.
VII. THE REALITY OF A TRIPARTITE STRUCTURE OF GOVERNMENT
In practice, the national, state, and tribal governments actively
participate in a tripartite federalism sanctioned by constitutional lan-
guage and Supreme Court precedent. Historically, Congress has at
times vigorously mounted attacks on tribal cultures and tribal gov-
ernments, treating them as a cultural mystery undeserving of federal
or state understanding and acceptance. The more recent history of
congressional legislation at times reveals respect, support, and posi-
tive action on behalf of tribal America, and homage to the right of
self-government as a participant in the overall dynamics of power in
the United States.
The Indian Child Welfare Act,"8 an attempt to curb the outward
flow of Native children from the tribe as a result of adoption and fos-
ter care decisions in state courts, gave statutory recognition to tribal
sovereignty. Congress declared that these issues involving tribal chil-
dren should be decided by tribal governments, required notice to a
tribe of state cases involving tribal children, and prohibited the
States, with some exceptions, from taking jurisdiction over tribal
children. This law has had both positive and negative effects on the
tribes because there are exceptions to tribal jurisdiction in the stat-
ute,judicial interpretation of the statutory language has at times been
construed against tribal authority, and state authorities do not always
follow the requirements of the act. Still, the law stands as congres-
sional recognition of sovereign tribal authority over Native children.
158 Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-608, 92 Stat. 3069 (1978).
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Congress also acknowledged tribal sovereignty on the issue of
gaming with the enactment of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act.' 39
This act recognizes the right of tribes to be generally free from state
regulation of gaming, and encourages States and tribes to develop
tribal-state compacts to resolve disputes over gaming issues. The law
seems simultaneously to honor and ignore tribal authority by prohib-
iting state control over tribal gaming while at the same time allowing
States to dictate to tribal governments, such as by telling tribes how
the money from gaming can be spent. Inconsistency notwithstand-
ing, this law exemplifies congressional recognition of tribal sover-
eignty over some aspects of gaming. These laws, and others like
them,' 40 indicate that Congress honors tribal sovereignty, a sover-
eignty that came into being before Congress existed. 14  In a statute
not generally considered to be "Indian law," Congress curbed the
practice of unfunded mandates to state, local, and tribal govern-
ments."' This law stands as one of many examples of the pedestrian
congressional acknowledgment that the sovereign tribal nations in
common practice participate within the sphere of American govern-
ment. They are governments having sovereign authority over people
who are also United States citizens.
A conventional form of state recognition of tribal sovereignty has
been the formation of voluntary tribal-state compacts, or tribal-state
accords, encompassing such issues as environmental protection,
criminal jurisdiction, traffic and safety, child protection, property use,
and education, among others. 143 Congress has strongly encouraged
the development of these accords in reference to gaming; however,
their use has gone far beyond this issue alone. These accords are,
based upon their explicit language, agreements between two sover-
eigns. Some States have also given recognition to tribal sovereignty
with either statutory or constitutional disclaimers of state jurisdiction
over tribes. This kind of deference between the States and tribes,
with encouragement from the national government, supports the
139 Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, Pub. L. No. 100-497, 102 Star. 2467 (1988).
140 See, e.g., Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act, 21 Stat. 88 (1975) (rep-
resenting a major policy shift toward support of tribal autonomy); Indian Reorganization Act,
ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984 (1934) (fostering the sovereign tribal right of self-regulation, but with
Eurocentric requirements). In the Indian Civil Rights Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1301 (1990), Congress
created civil rights legislation ostensibly to strengthen tribal self-government. The reality of this
legislation, however, is that the sovereign power of tribal governments has been limited by the
hands of Congress.
141 Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
142 Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-4, 104 Stat. 48 (1995).
143 Joseph P. Mazurek, EPA's Treatment of Tribes as States, Panel Before the 23rd Annual
Federal Bar Association Indian Law Conference (April 2-3, 1998). See also Note, Intergovernmen-
tal Compacts in Native American Law: Models for Expanded Usage, 112 HARV. L. REV. 922 (1999).
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concept of States and tribes as sister sovereigns within a trifederal
structure of government.
Federal and state courts have paid deference to the sovereignty of
tribal courts not only in substantive decisions by the courts, but also
in administrative actions.' 44 One growing example is the establish-
ment of federal/state/tribal judicial councils, or forums, where juris-
dictional issues can be discussed by judges representing the three
sovereigns. In discussing the establishment of a council composed of
federal, state, and tribal judges in the Ninth Circuit, Chief Judge
Wallace commented that, "[i] t is not intuitively obvious that the fed-
eral courts have a legitimate role to play in diplomatic relations with
tribal courts. The two systems are, after all, independent, serving dif-
ferent sovereigns."' 45 He went on to explain the importance of the
work done by these advisory bodies to smooth out potential judicial
conflicts over federal, state and tribal sovereignty. The State of Wis-
consin has established such a council composed of federal, state, and
tribal judges, calling it the Tribal Forum, or alternatively, the "fed-
eral, state, tribal judicial forum." In Teague v. Bad River Band of the
Lake Superior Tribe of Chippewa Indians, the Wisconsin Supreme
Court brought attention to the Tribal Forum in a conflict between
state and tribal sovereign authority. The plaintiff-employee had re-
ceived judgment against the tribe in state court on an employment
contract, and the defendant-tribe had won judgment in tribal court
declaring the contract invalid. The Wisconsin Supreme Court de-
clined to uphold the state court damage award even though the state
action was the first to be filed. Explicitly acknowledging tribes as
"separate sovereigns,' '147 the court remanded the case, directing the
state trial court to communicate with the Bad River tribal court to
work out the issue of which court had sovereign authority in this case
as a matter of comity. No state protocols for allocation of judicial ju-
risdiction had yet been established. The court then noted the ongo-
ing work of the newly created Tribal Forum, and invited the group of
state, federal, and tribal judges to continue the development of ap-
propriate protocols for future cases.' The Teague decision encour-
ages and exemplifies trifederalism in action.
144 In 1999, the Federal Bar Association granted official status to tribal courts as "courts of
record" for purposes of determining membership in the association. Attorneys and lay advo-
cates who have not been admitted to practice before state or federal courts, but have been ad-
mitted to practice before tribal courts, can now request membership.145 - - .-Hon. J. Clifford Wallace, A New Era of Federal-Tribal Court Cooperation, Address Before
the 23rd Annual Federal Bar Association Indian Law Conference (Apr. 2-3, 1998).
146 599 N.W.2d 911 (Wis. 2000).
147 Id. at 916.
M Teague v. Bad River Band of the Lake Superior Tribe of Chippewa Indians, 612 N.W.2d
709, 718 n.l (Wis. 2000) ("We believe that this is a logical forum for the development of pro-
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A significant proportion of trifederalism interaction occurs be-
tween tribal governments and surrounding local governments, or
more particularly, between tribal courts and tribal police, on one
hand, and the local state courts and local city and county police, on
the other. Within the trifederalism framework, and for purposes of
the Constitution, local police and local courts fall under the category
of "the state."' 49 This day-to-day interaction between the tribe and the
State at the local level includes, for example, the cross-deputizing of
officers as representatives of both the tribe and the State, local state
court extension of full faith and credit to tribal court decisions, local
county sheriff enforcement of tribal court decisions, and tribal court
extension of full faith and credit to state court decisions."' In addi-
tion, States may provide facilities for incarceration of those convicted
in tribal court, and States may provide financial help for the foster
care of tribal children after adjudication in tribal court.
This discussion points to the often unrecognized reality, from only
a few of its many perspectives, that tribal governments, with their in-
herent right of self-government, are an integral part of governmental
action within the United States. The perception of tribes as sovereign
governments within the United States is a pervasive one in the sys-
temic interaction of tribe, State, and Union.
VIII. THE CONSEQUENCES OF FAILING To RECOGNIZE TRIFEDERALISM
AS A CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLE
Every tribe is potentially in peril of diminished self-government
without a continued judicial acknowledgment that sovereign tribal
authority has constitutional status. The example of one tribe is given
here to highlight the consequences engendered by the Court's er-
ratic and unstable federal Indian law policy in the case of Alaska v.
Native Village of Venetie Tribal Government.T' Venetie, a village within
the Arctic Circle in the northern reaches of Alaska, is home to the
Neets'aii Gwich'in. When the Native village attempted to tax the
State of Alaska on the building of a school on tribal land, the State
ultimately challenged the tax in the United States Supreme Court.
tocols governing the exercise of jurisdiction between the state and tribal courts."). A protocol
for the allocation ofjurisdiction between state and tribal courts was signed between the Wiscon-
sin Tenth Judicial District and the four tribal nations located within that district, the Bad River,
Lac Courte Oreilles, Red Cliff, and St. Croix Bands of Chippewa, in December 2001. Carol
Tebben, Trifederalism in the Aftermath of Teague: The Interaction of State and Tribal Courts in Wiscon-
sin, 26 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 177 (2002).
149 See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
150 Interview with Penny Nelson, Court Clerk, St. Croix Reservation, in Hertel, Wis. (July 13,
2000). See also WIS. STAT. § 806.245 (2002) (requiring state officials to honor the acts of tribal
governments under specified conditions).
151 522 U.S. 520 (1998).
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Since the Court had previously interpreted sovereign tribal authority
to include, inter alia, the right to tax non-Indian activities on tribal
land, 152 the case raised the fundamental issue of tribal sovereignty.
The decision in Venetie about the tribe's right to tax the activities of
the State of Alaska on tribal land turned on whether or not the village
of Venetie was Indian country, a legal designation that, according to
Congress, includes reservations, former allotments, and dependentIndia ... 153
Indian communities. For purposes of this Comment, the case
turned upon the constitutional status of this remote Native village
within the framework of American government.
In its Venetie decision, the Supreme Court came to the remarkable
legal conclusion that the remote Native village of Venetie was not In-
dian country. The conclusion, based primarily upon the language of
the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA), is remarkable in
the sense that it does not comport with common sense, history, tradi-
tion, or reality. 54 Rather than answer the question of how the Native
village of Venetie fits within the constitutional framework of Ameri-
can government, the Court's decision instead magnified the need for
an answer to this question. Without an ongoing judicial acknowl-
edgment of the constitutional status of tribal nations to lend consis-
tency to federal Indian law, each challenge to tribal authority forces a
tribe to assert its own sovereignty. In Venetie, the Neets'aii Gwich'in
were at a legal disadvantage, because although the sovereignty of the
tribe was negatively affected by the outcome, the issue of sovereignty
was given minimal consideration by the Court. The Court failed to
observe that the sovereign right of tribal self-government has extra-
congressional, even extra-judicial, origin, and that the sovereign right
of self-government has constitutional recognition.
Since the land owned by the Neets'aii Gwich'in in Venetie was not a
reservation or former allotment, the Court reasoned that, in order to
be classified as Indian country, the village must be designated as a
"dependent Indian community." This designation required the satis-
faction of two requirements: first, that the land be "set-aside" by Con-
gress for Indian use and secondly, that there be "federal superinten-
dence" of the land.'55 According to the Court, neither of these
requirements was satisfied in Venetie.
Addressing the "set-aside" prong, the Court observed that, under
ANCSA, Congress had allowed the tribe to own the land in fee simple
152 See Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Navajo Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 195 (1985); Merrion v. Jicarilla
Apache Tribe, 453 U.S. 920 (1981); Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Coleville Indian
Reservation, 447 U.S. 134 (1980).
153 Venetie, 522 U.S. at 525.
15 See 43 U.S.C.A. § 1601 (1986); Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, Pub. L. No. 92-203,
§ 2, 85 Stat. 688 (1971). See also 18 U.S.C.S. § 1151 (1994).
'5 Venetie, 522 U.S. at 531.
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with the authority to sell it to non-Indiansj and therefore it could
not be considered "set-aside for Indian use." Under the slight of
hand of non-Indian common law principles of property, the tribe was
in effect stripped of sovereign power because of the way it now tech-
nically owned the land, even though this had been tribal land since
time immemorial. To hold that the land was not technically Indian
country defied centuries of history, and defied the tradition of the
Neets'aii Gwich'in to govern the isolated region as tribal land.
Venetie was not considered to be subject to "federal superinten-
dence" under the second prong because the Neets'aii Gwich'in were
essentially independent. It is ironic that, under the congressional re-
quirement that a tribe be a "dependent Indian community" to be In-
dian country, the result is that the more independent a tribe be-
comes, the less it is considered to be Indian. The Court in Venetie
recognized this non sequitur but declined to resolve it, stating:
The Tribe's federal superintendence argument, moreover, is severely
undercut by its view of ANSCA's primary purposes, namely, to effect Na-
tive self-determination and to end paternalism in federal Indian rela-
tions .... The broad federal superintendence requirement for Indian
country cuts against these objectives, but we are not free to ignore that
requirement as codified."'
The Court defied common sense by holding that a tribe that has be-
come more independent in governing its own affairs has become less
Indian.
If ANSCA had been created by Congress with a full understanding
that tribal nations and their sovereign right of self-government were
constitutionally recognized, it is possible that it would have been
more sensitive to the sovereign rights it affected. In a comparable
way, if Venetie had been decided by the Court with an explicit refer-
ence to constitutionally-recognized sovereign tribal authority, it is
possible that the Court would have been more sensitive to this issue.
Instead, the Supreme Court, in deciding against Venetie, approvingly
quoted Judge Fernandez, who concurred in the Ninth Circuit opin-
ion below decided in favor of Venetie. Referring to ANCSA, Fernan-
dez stated that "[i] t attempted to preserve Indian tribes, but simulta-
neously attempted to sever them from the land; it attempted to leave
them as sovereign entities for some purposes, but as sovereigns with-
out territorial reach."1' Even though this statement was offered in
support of Venetie's sovereign authority to tax, the Supreme Court
instead used the statement to support the Court's decision to disallow
1'6 See id. at 533.
157 Id. at 534.
1 Id. at 526 (quoting Alaska ex rel. Yukon Flats Sch. Dist. v. Native Vill. of Venetie Tribal
Gov't, 101 F.3d 1286 (9th Cir. 1996) (Fernandez,J., concurring)).
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that power. The final decision of the Supreme Court in Venetie-that
the remote Native village was not Indian country and therefore did
not have the sovereign authority to tax the activities of non-Indians
on tribal land-did not comport with the reality that this was a re-
mote Native village that owned and governed its land. Even the defi-
nition of sovereignty itself was diminished by the decision.
A unifying constitutional framework could be especially beneficial
to a tribal village such as Venetie. Due primarily to the lack of treaty
protection in Alaska, and without a continued judicial recognition of
the constitutional status of sovereign tribal authority, Native peoples
within the State must usually rely upon express congressional statu-
tory language for protection of their sovereign authority. 59 The con-
siderable disparity in federal Indian law has made congressional pol-
icy and judicial interpretation unpredictable, not only in Alaska, but
also for all tribes throughout the United States. It is not argued here
that the continued judicial recognition of the constitutional status of
tribal self-government is confined to the issue of victory or defeat in a
single case. The States (unlike tribes) have a continued judicial rec-
ognition of the constitutional status of state sovereignty as a founda-
tion upon which to defend sovereign authority, yet a State does not
always win a case where state sovereignty is at stake. It is not expected
that a tribe would win in every case involving sovereign tribal author-
ity.
If the tribe had been arguing from a foundation based upon a
persistent judicial recognition of the constitutional status of tribal
sovereignty in Venetie, the Neets'aii Gwich'in would have had a strong
argument to protect the right to tax non-Indian activities on their
land, and perhaps they would have been successful. If Venetie had
been decided within a trifederalist perspective, the Court's banal as-
sertion of congressional plenary authority over Native affairs (sans
constitutional reference) at minimum would have been tempered by
the judicial recognition of sovereign tribal authority as a constitu-
tional principle, and possibly even replaced with a staunch judicial
defense of such a principle. The Venetie decision represents only one
example among many in which the liberty of self-government for Na-
tive Americans has been threatened."6° Without an enduring and ex-
159 See Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 273 (1955) (exemplifying the Court's
reliance on express congressional language).
160 See, e.g., Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645 (2001) (invalidating tribe's hotel
occupancy tax upon nonmembers on non-Indian fee land within reservation); Nevada v. Hicks,
533 U.S. 353 (2001) (denying tribal jurisdiction to adjudicate warden's alleged tortuous con-
duct in executing a warrant for off-reservation crime); Strate v. A-i Contractors, 520 U.S. 438
(1997) (denying tribal authority over nonmembers involved in an accident occurring on state
highway through reservation land); South Dakota v. Bourland, 508 U.S. 679 (1993) (limiting
tribal sovereign authority over nonmember hunting and fishing on reservation land); Duro v.
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plicit judicial mandate to respect the constitutional status of tribal
sovereignty, the Court in Venetie was able to quietly and deftly avoid
the issue of sovereign authority, making the decision fundamentally
inconsistent with a constitutional doctrine of trifederalism.
IX. CONCLUSION AND COMMENCEMENT
The States, the federal government, and tribal nations interact
within a trifederal structure of American government. Congress, the
President, the Court, and the States have all in some, and indeed
many ways, given recognition to tribes as sovereign entities. If tribal
governments retain a limited sovereignty, and if they are domestic as
opposed to foreign nations, then a trisovereign, or a trifederal struc-
ture does exist in the United States. Trifederal interaction occurs in
a multitude of ways, providing a meaningful context for analyses of
the nature and extent of sovereign tribal authority.
Tribes are nations within a nation not only in an historic sense,
but also in a constitutional sense.16  Tribal governments are given
recognition in the Constitution as sovereign nations, and sovereign
tribal authority is grounded in enduring constitutional principles.
The Supreme Court has declared that the Constitution acknowledges
the nation status of tribes.6 2 With a triple citizenship as citizens of
the tribe, the State, and the United States, tribal members hold an
inherent constitutional right to self-determination. These indicators
of the constitutional status of tribes as nations within the United
States compel respect for sovereign tribal authority.
Adhering to constitutional principle, the words of the Constitu-
tion, and its own precedent of interpreting the document, the Court
could again, and more clearly, effect the meaningful inclusion of
tribal America within the United States. This inclusion would en-
compass a persistent acknowledgment by the Supreme Court of the
constitutional status of tribal nations, a status that had its obscure
conception upon the writing of the Constitution, subsequently sup-
ported by treaties and Supreme Court interpretation. A judicially
recognized constitutional trifederalism flows naturally from the judi-
cial recognition of the constitutional status of tribal nations.
Trifederalism, with its historic constitutional roots, has an emerg-
ing future as the skeletal framework upon which intergovernmental
Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990) (limiting the sovereign authority of the tribe to prosecute nonmem-
ber Indians); Nat'l Farmers Union Ins. v. Crow Tribe, 471 U.S. 8045 (1985) (holding that fed-
eral courts have jurisdiction to entertain challenges to the civil jurisdiction of tribal courts over
nonmembers); Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978) (declaring that tribal
courts do not possess criminal jurisdiction over nonmembers).
161 DELORIA& LYrLE, supra note 7.
162 See supra text accompanying note 55.
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relationships within the United States can be built, lending clarity to
a dynamic that has been marked with inconsistency and injustice.
The purpose of this work has been to provide sufficient arguments to
engender a dialogue about trifederalism as a theoretical perspective
of the constitutional structure of American government, and as a
critical component of American jurisprudence. Another purpose has
been to submit some persuasive evidence (though admittedly not
complete) to continue to verify the existence of trifederalism in ac-
tion. It is anticipated that a continuing verification will enrich, enli-
ven and expand the clarification of the trifederalism that does exist in
American government, foreclosing a "down the hall" approach to
tribal nation status. The two evolving academic discussions, one
about the dynamics of federalism and the other about the sovereignty
of tribal nations, would effectively be joined as one.
